

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 04285 01 OF 02 122048Z

72

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 SS-15 NSC-10 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 PA-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 TRSE-00 MBFR-04 SAJ-01 INRE-00

ACDA-19 OIC-04 DRC-01 /131 W  
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O R 121930Z SEP 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1549

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4285

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE-BELGIAN PAPER ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. SUMMARY. BELGIAN DELEGATION HAS CIRCULATED TEXT (INFORMAL MISSION TRANSLATION BELOW) OF PAPER ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY IN CSCE WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED AT SEPTEMBER 18 POLADS MEETING IN CONNECTION WITH COMMITTEE'S CONTINUING WORK ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE UNDERSTAND FROM INTERNATIONAL STAFF SOURCE THAT BELGIAN PAPER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY ICAO AND THAT GENERAL REACTION OF NINE EXCEPT FRANCE WAS FAVORABLE. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD WELCOME WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS ON BELGIAN PAPER FOR SEPTEMBER 18 MEETING. END SUMMARY.

2. TEXT OF BELGIAN PAPER (INFORMAL TRANSLATION) FOLLOWS:  
BELGIAN CONTRIBUTION TO A DEFINITION OF A COMMON  
POLICY ON THE TREATMENT OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY  
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PAGE 02 NATO 04285 01 OF 02 122048Z

OTHER THAN CBM'S DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CSCE

1) THERE IS WITHOUT QUESTION A PROBLEM OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION  
IN EUROPE, WHICH CONTRASTS WITH THE SOOTHING REMARKS OF

THE EASTERN COUNTRIES AND THE POLICY OF DETENTE WHICH THEY CLAIM THEY WISH TO FOLLOW. WE CANNOT CONCEIVE OF A TRUE DETENTE WHICH IGNORES THIS REALITY. DURING THE HELSINKI CONSULTATIONS, ALL DELEGATIONS WERE MOREOVER IN AGREEMENT, WITH MORE OR LESS SINCERITY, THAT IN THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURI-

ITY THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY WERE COMPLEMENTARY.

2) PARAGRAPHS 22-24 OF THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HELSINKI CONCERN MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. ASIDE FROM THE CBM'S ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 23, WHAT CAN THEORETICALLY BE EXPECTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA? AMONG THE OTHER POSSIBLE SUBJECTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS, WHICH ONES SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY, EITHER IN SUPPORT OF ONE OF OUR DIRECT INTERESTS OR TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES?

3) LET US LOOK FIRST AT SOME ASPECTS OF CBM'S ON WHICH PARAGRAPH 23 ENVISAGES THAT THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD PREPARE A DOCUMENT. WE ALREADY HAVE AN EXPLANATORY DOCUMENT CIRCULATED AT HELSINKI BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION. OUR POSITIONS SHOULD BE MADE MORE PRECISE. IT IS NECESSARY TO DEFINE WHAT THE DOCUMENT ADOPTED AT THE END OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD CONTAIN AT A MINIMUM IN ORDER THAT IT HAVE SOME MEANING;

A) THE DOCUMENT SHOULD INVOLVE AN ENGAGEMENT OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN WHICH THE STATES UNDERTAKE TO ANNOUNCE MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS.

B) IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION ALL MOVEMENTS WHICH CAN HAVE A DISTURBING CHARACTER. IN THIS WAY WE WILL REALIZE A PURPOSE WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO US AND WE WILL ALSO SUPPORT THE POSITION OF THE NEUTRALS, OF YUGOSLAVIA AND OF ROMANIA, WHO HAVE THE MOST IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN NOT BECOMING THE OBJECTS OF POLITICAL PRESSURES. WE WOULD ALSO BE CONTINUING IN THIS MATTER THE REAPPROCHEMENT  
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PAGE 03 NATO 04285 01 OF 02 122048Z

REALIZED WITH THESE STATES DURING THE HELSINKI CONSULTATIONS.

WE MUST THEN DETERMINE WHICH MOVEMENTS ARE OF A NATURE TO CREATE TENSION OR TO BE MISINTERPRETED; THESE ARE THE ONES WHICH SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED. WE LIMIT OURSELVES HERE TO MOVEMENTS OF GROUND FORCES. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO FORESEE THEIR SIZE AND THE GEOPGRAPHIC LOCATION OF THE MOVEMENTS, WHICH LEADS US INEVITABLY TO THE DEFINITION OF A ZONE. IT SEEMS, HOWEVER, INOPPORTUNE TO SPEAK OF FRONTIERS BECAUSE THIS COULD SUBSEQUENTLY COMPROMISE THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF TROOPS BELONGING TO AN EVENTUAL UNIFIED EUROPEAN FORCE.

C) THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION OF THE ENGAGEMENTS

IS VERY DELICATE AND IS OBVIOUSLY LINKED TO THE COMPULSORY CHARACTER OF NOTIFICATIONS. PERHAPS IT IS PREFERABLE TO LEAVE THIS QUESTION TO ONE SIDE. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE IN ACCOUNT THE RELATIONSHIPS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN CBM'S IN THE CSCE CONTEXT AND COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN MBFR. BY INSISTING TO STRONGLY ON VERIFICATION OF CBM'S, WOULD WE NOT RISK HAVING THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THE MEASURES WHICH WE PROPOSE AS CBM'S AS CONSTITUTING A MINIMALIST PRECEDENT FOR THE PRECISE VERIFICATION WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO OBTAIN IN VIENNA?

4) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE TO GO BEYOND CBM'S, AS FAR AS MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY ARE CONCERNED, WAS ONE OF THE MOST DISCUSSED THEMES DURING PREPARATORY TALKS. PARAGRAPHS 22 AND 24 OF THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FORSEE THAT AT THE CONFERENCE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY COULD BE REAISED INITIALLY DURING THE OPENING PHASE AND THEN DURING THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEES. AS TO WHETHER THE COMMITTEES WILL PREPARE A DOCUMENT ON THIS SUBJECT, IT IS NECESSARY TO WAIT UNTIL THIS QUESTION IS DEBATED IN GENEVA BECAUSE PARAGRAPH 24 IS NOT EXPLICIT ON THIS POINT. TO GO FURTHER INTO THE VIEWS OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH, DURING THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS, CAME OUT IN FAVOR OF THE CONFERENCE TREATING "OTHER" MILITARY  
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PAGE 01 NATO 04285 02 OF 02 122101Z

72

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4285

5) IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL ABOVE ALL AT GENEVA THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE GIVE IN AN EXPLICIT MANNER EXPRESSION TO OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH

THE EXISTING MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.  
SUCH AN EXPRESSION IS INDISPENSABLE TO GIVE A BALANCED  
PRESENTATION TO THE PREMISES OF THE DIPLOMATIC EXERCISE  
REPRESENTED BY THE CONFERENCE AND TO AVOID THAT OUR PUBLIC  
OPINIONS-HAVE ALLUSIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DECISIONS  
WHICH, IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CONFERENCE, RISK BEING LIMITED,  
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CBM'S, TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF A POLITICAL  
CHARACTER.

6) WHAT CONSEQUENCES SHOULD WE DRAW FROM THIS VERY  
GENERAL IDEA? IT IS NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO FIX OUR POSITION,  
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TWO POLITICAL ELEMENTS:

A) A DATE HS BEEN FIXED FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.  
THIS NEGOTIATION, IN OUR VIEW, IS PART OF THE SAME GENERAL  
CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES HAS  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 04285 02 OF 02 122101Z

BEEN REALIZED BY THE OPENING OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

B) THE "OTHER" MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY ARE AN  
AREA ON WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE COMMON POSITIONS AND FOR THIS  
REASON IT WOULD WITHOUT DOUBT BE INOPPORTUNE FOR US TO  
TAKE AN INITIATIVE.

IT WOULD, THEREFORE, SEEM PREFERABLE ON THE "OTHER"  
MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, BEYOND THE EXPRESSEION OF  
OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND THE  
QUESTION OF CBM'S, TO ADOPT A WAITING TACTIC, LEAVING IT  
TO THE NEUTRAS, TO YUGOSLAVIA, AND TO ROMANIA TO TAKE THE  
INITIATIVE OF PRESENTING PROPOSALS, TO ENCOURAGE THEM  
IN THIS AND TO SUPPORT THESE PROPOALS WHENEVER THEY SEEM  
COMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN POSITIONS. THE PROGRESSION OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WILL ENABLE US TO CLARIFY OUR VIEWS.

7) THE TACTICAL QUESTION THUS BEING RESOLVED, WHAT  
COULD BE THE CONTENT OF PROPOSALS WHICH COULD BE SUPPORTED  
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HELSINKI?

A) TO WELCOME CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE UNDERWAY  
ON THE LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND TO EXPRESS  
THE DESIRE OF SEEING THESE NEGOTIATIONS END IN POSITIVE  
RESULTS;

B) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED ON BY  
A LIMITED NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WILL RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE  
INTEREST OF COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY WILL NOT END BY UPSETTING THE  
CONDITIONS OF THEIR SECURITY. IT IS NOT, IN EFFECT, USEFUL  
TO CARRY ON A REGIONAL DISARMAMENT EFFORT WITHOUT TAKING INTO  
ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN  
THIS EFFORT. IN THE SAME CONTEXT, IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY  
THAT THOSE WHO DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS

DO NOT TAKE, FROM THEIR SIDE, MEASURES WHICH WOULD PUT IN DANGER THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN;

C) TO CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE WHICH PERMITS THOSE WHO ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO INFORM OTHER EUROPEAN STATES WHICH SHOW AN INTEREST AND ALSO ALLOW NON-PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 04285 02 OF 02 122101Z

MAKE THEIR CONCERNS KNOWN TO THE PARTICIPATING STATES. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF SUBMITTING FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE 34 PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE CSCE THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED ON IN VIENNA. SUCH A PROCESS OF RECIPROCAL INFORMATION FLOWS MOREOVER FROM THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN SUBPARA (B) ABOVE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT, THE WESTERN POLICY, IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO CARRY OUT THIS PROCESS OF INFORMATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF BECAUSE THE CONFERENCE WILL CONCLUDE WELL BEFORE MBFR AND IT IS NECESSARY TO AVOID THE CREATION OF A RAISON D'ETRE FOR A PERMANENT ORGAN WHICH WOULD HAVE THIS AS ONE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THE MODALITIES FOR INFORMING NON-PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS.

8) CONCLUSIONS:

WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HELSINKI, OUR POSITION COULD BE:

--TO INSIST THAT A DOCUMENT OF THE CONFERENCE CLEARLY EXPRESS OUR CONCERNS OVER THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE;

--TO GIVE A MAXIMALIST EXTENSION OF CBM'S AND TO INCLUDE TROOP MOVEMENTS IN CBM'S;

--WITHOUT TAKING THE INITIATIVE, TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO:

A) EXPRESS THE DESIRE THAT CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE UNDERTAKEN CONCLUDE IN POSITIVE RESULTS;

B) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESPECT THE INTERESTS OF NON-PARTICIPANTS;

C) TO CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE THAT INTERESTED NON-PARTICIPANTS BE INFORMED OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. END OF TEXT.

3. COMMENT: WHILE THERE ARE ASPECTS OF BELGIAN PAPER CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 04285 02 OF 02 122101Z

WITH WHICH WE ARE UNABLE TO AGREE, I.E. INCLUSION OF MOVE-  
MENTS IN CBM'S, MISSION BELIEVES THAT GENERAL TACTICAL  
APPROACH PROPOSED BY BELGIAN PAPER IS ACCEPTABLE. WE  
WOULD APPRECIATE ANY WASHINGTON COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER 18  
MEETING.

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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